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 Incorporating Time-Lag Effects Into The Expectancy Model
 of Motivation: A Reformulation of the Model1
 BRONSTON T. MAYES
 University of Nebraska, Lincoln
corporating Time-Lag Effects Into The Expectancy Model
 Of cognitive theories of motivation, the
 most intensively researched in recent years is
 the Valence-Instrumentality-Expectancy (VIE)
 theory. A recent review of VIE research (9)
 shows the valence model to be reasonably pre-
 dictive of occupational preference, job satisfac-
 tion, and valence of performance. The behav-
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 ioral choice model has not fared so well; al-
 though it moderately predicts self-ratings of job
 effort, its efficiency in predicting criteria meas-
 ured by other than self-ratings is questionable.
 When the behavioral choice model is used in
 research, the following findings are typical:
 1. Intrinsic outcomes (feelings of accom-
 plishment, etc.) are better predictors of
 1 Portions of this note were presented as a paper at the 17th
 Annual Meeting of the Western Division Academy of Man-
 agement, Santa Barbara, California, April 9,1976.
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 FIGURE 1. The Temporal Dimension.
 satisfaction and performance than are
 extrinsic outcomes (pay, promotions,
 etc.).
 2. Small variances are obtained in valence
 measures; thus, multiplying expectancy
 by valence does not increase predicta-
 bility over use of expectancy alone.
 3. Causal tests using time series designs
 are inconclusive.
 In addition to a number of methodological
 problems, these findings led Mitchell (9) to sug-
 gest development of more accurate theoretical
 representations and better construct measures.
 The Forgotten Variable
 Behavioralists have long recognized the im-
 portance of the performance-reward time lag in
 administration of rewards and punishments to
 influence behavior. The notion is that the more
 immediate the consequence of a behavior, the
 more likely the behavior will be reinforced.
 Opsahl and Dunnette (10) state that one of the
 most important variables in determining the ef-
 fectiveness of money as a reinforcer is the sched-
 ule by which it is administered.
 Surprisingly expectancy theorists have over-
 looked such an important variable in shaping be-
 havior.
 Even though some writers (4, 5, 7, 12, 15, 16)
 have recognized the utility of considering the
 impact of time lag effects on motivation, no one
 has attempted to incorporate this variable into a
 VIE formulation. The purpose of this article is to
 present a reformulation of the VIE behavioral
 choice model that accounts for time-lag effects.
 The Temporal Dimension
 Obviously the VIE components (motive,
 force, effort, task goal performance, and out-
 come attainment) occur sequentially. Figure 1
 represents this temporal relationship. Some mo-
 tive force precedes effort which, in turn, leads to
 some level of task goal performance. When out-
 comes are contingent upon performance, they
 will accrue to the individual after performance
 is demonstrated, but experience and intuition
 lead us to believe that these outcomes could be
 staggered in their receipt.
 In Figure 1, 01 and 02 are intrinsic outcomes
 which are experienced immediately upon per-
 formance of a task. There is no perceptible time
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 Where: Vt - Valence of an outcome to be received at time t.
 V0 - Valence of an outcome if received immediately (t = 0).
 d = Discount rate applicable to outcome.
 t = Length of time between effort and outcome.
 FIGURE 2. Hypothesized Effect of Time Lag on Valence.
 lag between performance and outcome attain-
 ment, although there might be an effort-per-
 formance time lag. 03, 04, and 05 could be con-
 sidered extrinsic outcomes and might accrue at
 different points in time. The important issue is
 that a single behavior can lead to multiple out-
 comes, all of which may not be attainable im-
 mediately. This time lag between expenditure of
 effort and attainment of an outcome is hypoth-
 esized to have some impact on the motivational
 force to expend effort.
 The Relationship of Time to Valence
 According to Vroom (14), valence is the an-
 ticipated satisfaction derived from an outcome
 and should be distinguished from the value of
 an outcome, which is the amount of actual satis-
 faction derived from its attainment. Whether
 one considers valence as a value or an antici-
 pated satisfaction, clearly outcomes may possess
 differing valences, and individuals are capable of
 establishing preferences for outcomes based on
 these differences in valence. VIE theorists have
 not considered adequately the possible relation-
 ship of time to attractiveness of outcomes.
 The time value of money has been estab-
 lished in the practice of financial management.
 Discount factors (interest rates a d cost of capi-
 tal computations) are used to de ermine the
 present value of investment alternatives. Those
 with the highest net resent value are typically
 chosen. Persons who have secured loans from
 l nding institutions are aware of interest charges
 based on the length of time the loan will be in
 effect. Even individuals who have not borrowed
 money are aware that the purchasing power of
 the dollar has declined steadily over the past 10
 years.
 The influence of time on the attractiveness
of non-mon tary incentives has not yet been de-
 termined empirically. Bu  it is intuitively appeal-
 ing to assume that individuals would prefer a
 promotion today r ther than next month and
 immediat  praise from a sup rvisor rather than
 praise at some later date. The distinction be-
 tween intrinsic and extrinsic rewards can be ex-
 plained to some degree by the time lapse be-
 tween performance and reward. The finding that
 intrinsic rewards are better predictors of satisfac-
 tion and performance (9) may rest on the time
 differential of their receipt.
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 If perceptions of valence are related to the
 effort-reward time lag, what is the mathematical
 nature of this relationship? People seem to per-
 ceive present time units as being longer in dura-
 tion than time units associated with past events
 (11). If future time units are assumed to be col-
 lapsed by individuals in a manner similar to past
 time units and if outcomes are assumed to retain
 some valence no matter how distant their at-
 tainment, an exponential function might be ap-
 propriate in linking valence to the temporal di-
 mension (see Figure 2).
 Such an exponential function has some in-
 teresting properties. First, valence will be strong-
 est for immediately attainable outcomes such
 as those normally termed intrinsic. As the time
 lag increases, the effect of each time increment
 on valence is reduced. Thus, anticipated rewards
 may have some motivating effect no matter how
 distant their attainment. Typical deferred re-
 wards of this nature are pensions, sabbatical
 leaves, and the less materialistic salvation. Sec-
 ond, this model specifies a discount factor d that
 determines the rate of valence reduction over
 time. This discount rate may be different for
 each outcome attainable. That is, some types of
 outcomes may be more time sensitive than
 others when determining outcome valence.
 Whether or not this proposed exponential
 relationship is indeed the true relationship be-
 tween perceptions of outcome valence and the
 time lag preceding outcome attainment is an
 empirical issue. Similarly, the assumption that
 different outcomes may show differential time
 sensitivity lends itself to empirical verification.
 The Time Discounted Expectancy Model
 In view of the above considerations, the ex-
 pectancy behavioral choice model should be
 reformulated in terms of the time dimension.
 Since outcomes of work behavior do not occur
 at the same point in time, we must account for
 the effect these time differences might have on
 motivation. Specifically, it is hypothesized that
 the force acting on an individual to perform an
 act at a given time is not just a function of ex-
 pectancy and valence, but a function of expect-
 ancy and valence of outcomes discounted to the
 point in time at which the act takes place. Pres-
 ent performance is a function of the discounted
 valence of first level outcomes multiplied by the
 expectancy that performance will eventually
 lead to the outcome. Mathematically:
 T n E2ij Vt, j
 F fi (1 +dj)
 t=O j=1
 Where:
 Fi = The motive force acting on an indi-
 dividual to perform activity i at
 time t= O.
 E 1, = The expectancy that effort exerted
 will result in the performance of
 activity i.
 T = The total time frame over which first
 level outcomes resulting from ac-
 tivity i are expected to accrue. It is
 assumed that time will be meas-
 ured in discrete units such as days,
 weeks, months, and years.
 E 2 j = The expectancy that performance of
 activity i will lead to outcome j in-
 dependent of time.
 Vt, = The undiscounted valence of out-
 comej to be received at time t.
 dj = The time based discount factor for
 outcomej.
 t = The time elapsed since exertion of
 effort to accomplish activity i.
 n = The number of first level outcomes
 anticipated as a result of activity i.
 The following assumptions are implict in this
 formulation:
 1. The primary effect of the effort-reward
 time lag is on perceptions of valence.
 2. Although time is a continuous variable,
 it is treated as discrete in this model, in
 accordance with the usual industrial
 practice of administering rewards at dis-
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 crete intervals such as weekly, or
 monthly. Even though rewards may be
 accrued continuously as in piece rate
 systems, actual reward receipt occurs at
 discrete time intervals.
 3. The possibility exists that individuals as-
 sign a different time discount factor to
 each first level outcome or class of out-
 comes. This discount factor can be de-
 rived empirically. The exponential rela-
 tionship proposed is based on the no-
 tion that some outcomes, money for ex-
 ample, can be invested to accrue addi-
 tional similar outcomes and from the
 elastic perceptions individuals have re-
 garding units of time.
 Empirical Support for VIE Reformulation
 In addition to folk knowledge ("A bird in
 hand is worth two in the bush,"), there is some
 empirical support for the contention that as the
 attainment of a reward becomes more immedi-
 ate the reward becomes more preferred. Ma-
 honey (8) reported that managers prefer straight
 salary as a reward to less immediately attainable
 pensions, insurance, or vacations. In a recent
 study (3), money earned by subjects on the first
 day of the study was not paid out until the last
 day. Researchers found an increase in perceived
 importance of money as an outcome over the
 six day time frame of the experiment. This eleva-
 tion of importance was independent of expect-
 ancy manipulations. Although the increase
 could be due to subjects' compensation for the
 lack of intrinsic job value (1) or to an increase in
 basic needs related to money, it also is possible
 that as the payoff date drew nearer, the valence
 of the reward increased as a function of time.
 Other researchers (13) have shown that during
 the job choice process as employment drew
 near, the valence of immediate and tangible
 outcomes increased. Although other explana-
 tions are plaucible, reward valence did increase
 as time of receipt approached.
 The incorporation of the time dimension
 into the expectancy model is further supported
 by selected methodological findings. Heneman
 and Schwab (2) report the test-retest reliability
 for expectancy measures to be higher than for
 valence measures. One explanation is that some
 rewards were more immediately attainable at
 the second administration of the questionnaire
 than at the first. The valence measure would
 change as a result of a shorter discount period at
 the second administration. Other writers (5, 6)
 provide more direct support for a time dis-
 counted model in their finding that (E x V) loses
 predictive pwower with increase in the time lag
 between E and V measures and the measure of
 effort or performance. The time-lag model
 would make such a prediction in that it assumes
 present, not future behavior to be determined
 by (E x V). Valence measures repeatedly have
 shown little variance, and combining valence
 and expectancy does not improve on the use of
 expectancy alone in predicting behavior. This
 may be due to employing questionnaire items
 that measure valence of rewards as if they are
 attainable in the present. Since organizations
 design incentive systems around highly attractive
 rewards, each should be highly valent in the
 present. Adjustment of these valences measures
 to account for the differential receipt of re-
 wards with respect to time should increase vari-
 ance in these measures and perhaps the predic-
 tive power of the model.
 Implications of the Time
 Discounted Model
 The primary distinction of this model is that
 current behavior is a function of the discounted
 valence of the rewards expected as a conse-
 quence of that behavior and the expectancy that
 effort will eventually lead to these rewards. Un-
 like earlier formulations of the expectancy mod-
 el, this revision allows for the consideration that
 rewards may be received sequentially and fur-
 thermore that the same class of reward may be
 obtained at different time intervals. Bonuses
 might be paid in increments to reduce an em-
 ployee's tax liability, or one's share of a profit
 378
 Academy of Management Review - April 1978
 sharing fund might not be available for use until
 some future date, even though the amount in
 the fund depended upon current performance.
 Thus, even though these incentives are based on
 current performance, a pay raise (also a mone-
 tary incentive) immediately available might
 carry more motive weight even if the absolute
 amount of the raise were far less than the future
 bonus payment.
 Time may differentially affect the valence
 assigned to different classes of incentives.
 Awareness of this relationship could guide ad-
 ministration of incentive plans. An optimal mix
 of incentives may be granted at specified time
 intervals after task accomplishment to maximize
 such factors as job satisfaction or productivity.
 Intrinsic rewards received at time t=O would
 not be discounted at all whereas pay raises might
 not accrue until some future salary review had
 taken place. The emphasis an organization
 places on various rewards should be tempered
 by time considerations.
 Future research must be addressed to the
 temporal relationships among VIE variables. A
 requisite first step would be to insure that instru-
 ments used to measure valence be worded to
 obtain present values/attractiveness of out-
 comes. Additional questionnaire items should
 be included to determine over what time frame
 receipt of outcomes is to take place. But even
 with appropriate instruments, viewing behavior
 as occurring immediately following motivational
 antecedents presents an interesting research de-
 sign problem. How can causal relationships be-
 tween motivational factors and behavior be
 demonstrated in field survey designs? The time
 discounted model would require measurement
 of a behavioral criterion immediately following
 measurement of the motivationally based pre-
 dictor. Traditional time lags of one to six months
 between measurement of predictors and crite-
 ria may be inappropriate for testing VIE based
 hypotheses. Unfortunately, time lags of only a
 few minutes, or perhaps hours, may lead to ex-
 treme subject reactivity to the research, thus re-
 quiring elaborate study designs to control for
 this effect.
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 A Comment on Organ's Reappraisal of the
 Satisfaction-Causes-Performance Hypothesis'
 PETER LORENZI
 The Pennsylvania State University
 Comment on Organ's Reappraisal of the
atisfaction-Caus s-Performance Hypothesis'
 A reinterpretation of the satisfaction-causes-
 performance hypothesis has been made by Or-
 gan (10). Based on the notion of equity in inter-
 personal exchanges, he argues that satisfied peo-
 ple attempt to reciprocate their benefactors. A
 review of previous static correlational, path ana-
 lytic, and cross-lag correlational analyses shows
 support for the performance-rewards-satisfac-
 tion causal linkage, Organ admits, but he identi-
 fies some underlying evidence suggestive of a
 satisfaction-causes-performance linkage. He
 then undertakes to reappraise the viability of
 this hypothesis, which many scientists felt they
 had resolved.
 An excellent analysis of the performance-
 satisfaction(-rewards) controversy has been
 made by Greene and Craft (4) in a comprehen-
 sive article examining the three hypotheses in-
 directly involved in Organ's work: (a) satisfac-
 tion causes performance; (b) performance
 Peter Lorenzi (M.B.A. - S.U.N.Y. Binghamton) is a doctoral
 candidate in Organizational Behavior at The Pennsylvania
 State University, University Park, Pennsylvania.
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i terpretation of the satisfaction-causes-
r ance hypothesi  has been made by Or-
( 0). Based on the notion of equity in i ter-
al exchanges, he argues that satisfied peo-
tte pt to reciprocate their ben factors. A
i  of previous static orrelational, path ana-
i , and cros -lag cor elational an lyses shows
rt for the performance-rewards-satisfac-
 causal linkage, Organ admits, but he identi-
 so e underlying evidence suggestive of a
action-causes-performance linkage. He
 ndertakes to reap raise the viability of
 pothesis, which many scientis s felt they
 causes satisfaction; and (c) rewards as a causal
 factor. Each hypothesis and its empirical support
 are reviewed. Greene and Craft state:
 the evidence to-date clearly supports the con-
 clusion that performance and satisfaction are
 covariants of a third variable (or variables).
 Particularly promising is the finding that re-
 wards based on current performance signifi-
 cantly affect subsequent performance (4, p.
 191).
 The authors explain how equity theory sup-
 ports the use of performance contingent re-
 wards for workers which will enable the organi-
 zation to retain highly productive workers who
 gain satisfaction from the appropriate reward of
 their performance (3). As seen by Greene and
 Craft, the problem for management is to ad-
 dress the problems of poorly directed workers,
 lack of ability, and performance obstacles and
 then institute a reward system that induces ef-
 fort and, subsequently, performance.
 1 Editor's Note: This is a response to Professor Dennis
 W. Organ's article entitled: "A Reappraisal and Rein-
 terpretation of the Satisfaction-Causes-Performance
 Hypothesis," which appeared in the January, 1977 issue
 of the Review.
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